Promoting “Healthy Childhoods” And Keeping Children ‘At Home”: Beninese Anti-Trafficking Policy In Times Of Neoliberalism’ by Howard, Neil
        
Citation for published version:
Howard, N 2013, 'Promoting “Healthy Childhoods” And Keeping Children ‘At Home”: Beninese Anti-Trafficking









This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: Howard, N. (2013), Promoting ‘Healthy Childhoods’ and
Keeping Children ‘At Home’: Beninese AntiTrafficking Policy in Times of Neoliberalism. Int Migr, 51: 87-102,
which has been published in final form at https://doi.org/10.1111/imig.12043. This article may be used for non-
commercial purposes in accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions for Self-Archiving.
University of Bath
Alternative formats
If you require this document in an alternative format, please contact:
openaccess@bath.ac.uk
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
Download date: 11. May. 2021
                         Beninese Anti-Trafficking Policy in Times of Neoliberalism 
 
Promoting ‘Healthy Childhoods’ and Keeping Children ‘At Home’: 





This paper offers the first examination of its kind of the content and nature of anti-
trafficking policy as it is pursued in Benin. The paper draws on data gathered from 
policy and project documents and from interviews and participant observation with 
actors integral to the constitution of policy in (and with influence over) the Beninese 
anti-trafficking community. It attempts to bridge the oft-lamented gap between page 
and practice by conducting analysis not only of the representation of policy in text, 
but also of its lived manifestations in processes, interactions and structures. It argues 
that the various different actors that comprise Benin’s anti-trafficking pantheon seek 
to accomplish one fundamental goal – to protect children from trafficking – through 
two overarching strategies – the promotion of ‘healthy’ childhoods and the pre-
emptive prevention of child movement. The paper examines each of the main strands 
of policy and concludes by offering a Foucauldian analysis of their operation. It thus 
fills a major gap in the academic understanding of anti-trafficking policy in the 
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‘People don’t realise how important our Ministry is –  
we are here to change people’s behaviour’. 
 





In this paper, I will examine the content and nature of anti-trafficking policy as it is 
pursued in Benin. The paper draws on data gathered from policy and project 
documents and from interviews and participant observation conducted over 14 
months with actors at every level of the Beninese anti-trafficking policy-chain. The 
paper attempts to bridge the oft-lamented gap between page and practice by 
conducting analysis not only of the representation of policy in text, but also of its 
lived manifestations in processes, interactions and structures (see, for example, 
McKee 2009). It demonstrates that, for all their differing institutional means and ends, 
the actors within this community seek to accomplish their shared goal – to protect 
children from trafficking – through two overarching strategies – the promotion of 
‘healthy’ childhoods and the pre-emptive prevention of child movement. It examines 
step by step the main strands of policy as I understand them, and concludes by 
offering a Foucauldian analysis of their operation. 
 
What is ‘Policy’? 
 
Whilst political scientists often address the ‘why’ underpinning ‘policy’, economists 
examine its ‘cost’, and ethnographers engage with the ‘how’, most never explain what 
‘policy’ actually consists of. Indeed, despite the voluminous literature addressing 
‘policy’ from various perspectives across the academic spectrum, surprisingly few 
definitions of what ‘policy’ actually ‘is’ are available. Notwithstanding this 
definitional gap, however, certain central trends do appear to run through the few 
classifications that are available. In the Oxford English Dictionary, for example, we 
learn that ‘policy’ is ‘a course or principle of action adopted or proposed by a 
government, party, business, or individual’. Similarly, in a paper designed to answer 
exactly the question posed by this section, Torjmann (2005:4), while cycling through 
various different and conflicting formulations, determines that ‘policy’ ‘represents the 
end result of a decision as to how best to achieve a specific objective’, while David 
Mosse calls ‘policy’ a ‘process’, inherently linked to ‘practice’, but often divorced 
from its intended consequences (1999). 
  
What these definitions seem to have in common is the notion that ‘policy’, as a 
positable and examinable reality (or ‘field’, in Bourdieu’s terms, 1977), exists 
independently of that to which it leads. Moreover, ‘policy’, such as it is understood 
above, consists of goals, means and ends, such that it can be termed the course of 
action determined and embarked upon as the manner best to achieve a particular 
result. The following section will discuss how this definition can be applied to tease 
out the core of anti-trafficking work in Benin.  
 
1 Where possible, all names of individuals, institutions and villages have been either changed or anonymised to protect the 
identity of informants. Details can be provided on request. Unless otherwise indicated, all translations from French are my own. 
                         Beninese Anti-Trafficking Policy in Times of Neoliberalism 
What am I Examining to Determine Anti-Trafficking Policy in Benin? 
 
If ‘policy’ is the course of action determined and embarked upon as the manner best 
to achieve a particular result, examining anti-trafficking policy in Benin requires us, 
first, to identify which actors are involved in determining and embarking upon a 
course of anti-trafficking action, second, what constitute the main lines of that anti-
trafficking action, and third, what is the particular end result towards which they 
work. 
 
Taking these three components of the definition individually, undoubtedly, and 
perhaps intuitively, the major stated end result desired by all those actors involved in 
Beninese anti-trafficking policy is the ‘protection of children’, generally, and ‘from 
trafficking’ in particular. We can see this clearly from even a cursory examination of 
policy documentation, and such an assessment is supplemented by copious interview 
data. ‘The major actors in the field of child protection’, declares the National Anti- 
Child Trafficking Plan of Action (POA), include the Family and Justice Ministries, 
UNICEF and the ILO (MFE and ILO 2008:2). For these bodies, ‘protecting children 
from trafficking’ is a key goal. UNICEF Benin record it as one of their key activities 
on their website, as well as in their internal documentary LOGFRAME’s. The Family 
Ministry’s raison d’être is child protection – ‘this is our overarching goal’ declared 
one senior staff-member (Interview with Salama, 11/3/10) – and their work against 
trafficking forms a major component thereof. Similarly, the Justice Ministry has an 
office specifically focussing on child protection, which is central to work in this field, 
while the ILO’s flagship project in the West African region, LUTRENA, is dedicated 
specifically to protecting children from trafficking. 
 
In terms of which actors are involved in determining what should constitute Benin’s 
national anti-trafficking strategy, the four bodies mentioned above naturally form the 
core. Indeed, the POA explicitly states that it was these bodies, amongst others, who 
came together to decide that an official strategy needed to be developed, in order to 
harmonise the interlinked and overlapping, yet officially un-coordinated, actions of 
the previous half-decade (MFE and ILO 2008:2). Interview and participant 
observation data confirm this and underline the wider centrality of these bodies. In 
one instance, I had been invited as a ‘trafficking expert’ to attend a major national 
workshop organised by an important INGO on child protection. In attendance were 
representatives of all the institutional actors involved in the field, including from these 
four bodies. Other participants included the ‘state and pseudo-state agencies’ 
(Interview with Alec, Senior IO Figure, Based in Benin, 23/2/10) that have been 
active in what they describe as ‘the fight against trafficking’ since its emergence in 
Benin at the start of the last decade, ranging from influential national and 
international NGOs to foreign donor agencies. 
 
Can we identify what, if any, overarching strategy or course of action has been 
determined and embarked upon by these actors? I believe so. First because, since 
2007, a national anti-trafficking POA has been in place, under the leadership of the 
Family Ministry, and in partnership with all the central players in the field (MFE and 
ILO 2007:2). My interviews and work experience tell me that this strategy, and the 
coordination that has been related to it, has seen a centralisation and a harmonisation 
between the efforts of the various bodies in the field, such that it is now legitimate to 
talk of an official and organised collective ‘course of action’. Second, and equally 
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importantly, because while this official(ised) strategic coordination dates only to 2007 
(even if early phases of discussion and planning took place in 2005/6), both the years 
after trafficking’s explosion in Benin in 2001 and those after the POA in 2007 saw 
actions and trends in actions which were sufficiently similar, overlapping and 
collectively focussed to be identified as ‘policy’, in the terms laid out above.  
 
What were these actions and trends? As I will elaborate more precisely in the 
following section, they involve the pre-emptive protection of children from the 
exploitation that is inherent to the crime of trafficking by promoting ‘healthy’ 
childhoods and regulating, managing and ultimately preventing child migration away 
from the ‘family home’ for work. This has involved multiple initiatives at multiple 
levels. Donor contributions range from behind-closed-door political advocacy to 
financial provisions; state contributions range from ratification of new laws to the 
extension of central power at the local level; while (I)NGO contributions include 
palliative care (in the form of shelters for victims), help at the level of individual 
families with schooling, and widespread ‘sensitisation’. Though each institution 
necessarily has different ‘outputs’, different ‘vertical’ discursive and practical 
institutional fields within which they operate, and different methodologies, their work 
has consistently contributed to the establishment of complimentary means to achieve 
the same end – in other words, a policy. It is to the content of this policy that the 
paper will now turn. 
 
What are the components of Anti-Trafficking Policy in Benin? 
 
In this section I will offer an examination of the multiple strands of Beninese anti-
trafficking policy. As will become apparent, the majority of initiatives fall into the 
category of protection from trafficking by prevention, while the final category is 




Undoubtedly the major plank of Beninese anti-trafficking policy is and has been the 
Law Regulating the Movement of Minors and Suppressing the Traffic in Children 
(Loi Nº 2006-04). Though only given Presidential assent in 2006 (with accompanying 
Decrees of Application finalised in 2009), actors across the anti-trafficking spectrum 
in (and with influence over) Benin pushed, cajoled and lobbied for the drafting and 
adoption of such a law almost immediately the issue exploded onto the national scene 
in 2001.  
 
Back in 2005, when I first worked in Benin, NGO representatives with whom I 
collaborated repeatedly bemoaned the lack of necessary anti-trafficking legislation in 
the country. Their complaints were echoed around the same time by the Committee 
on the Rights of the Child in Geneva, while various international and bilateral 
representatives present in the country had been extirpating the value of legislation 
since much earlier. When discussing the eventual adoption of the law with colleagues 
between 2007 and 2010, it became clear quite how invested the Beninese 
government’s partners were in such an event. Cecile, a senior donor representative 
working in Benin, explained that donors and (I)NGOs had come together well before 
the Beninese government gave its assent to draw up a draft text for legislation 
(Interview with Cecile, 17/12/9). JR and Alexia, both high-level INGO 
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representatives working on Benin, explained that one donor and one UN agency in 
particular had placed massive pressure on the government to ‘get a law on the books’ 
as quickly as possible (Interview with JR, 5/6/9; Interview with Alexia, 1/9/7). The 
donor had, according to various interviewees, threatened the Beninese government 
with a cut in funding if such legislation were not forthcoming, while the UN agency 
had, according to its then representative, pulled together figures from all the Western 
embassies, bilateral agencies and major INGOs in Cotonou in order to get them to 
support these threats and calls for legal change (Interview with Phil, 9/11/9). 
 
That the adoption of the law was seen as such a central pillar of anti-trafficking 
protection more broadly, and such a central component of each individual entity’s 
anti-trafficking strategy in particular, can be seen from the way it has subsequently 
been represented. The US Trafficking in Persons (TIP) reports went from lambasting 
Benin’s lack of a suitable legal framework during the early part of the last decade to 
congratulating ‘[t]he Government of Benin [for it’s] solid efforts to combat trafficking 
through law enforcement efforts’ (USDS 2007:65). Similarly, on its website, UNICEF 
‘hailed the adoption of a new law to combat child trafficking in the Republic of 
Benin’, claiming that it ‘will strengthen the legal framework surrounding the efforts to 
combat child trafficking and will facilitate the implementation of activities led in this 
field by the government and various partners’2.  
 
As for the content of the law itself, it seeks to both establish norms around which 
kinds of child movement (and economic activity) are legitimate and to ban and 
suppress all others. In this regard, it is significant to note that the law’s full title refers 
to ‘Regulating the Movement of Minors’ more broadly, and not merely to 
‘Suppressing the Traffic in Children’.  
 
What does this regulation entail? In Article 7, the law establishes that children cannot 
legally be displaced within the borders of the country unless accompanied either by a 
direct parent or guardian or with the consent of a local government official. As the 
law and its related decrees go on to explain, this consent will only be forthcoming if a 
number of conditions are met. First, a family ‘placing’ a child must have all the 
child’s papers in order. Second, they must have enough money to pay for the child’s 
return. And third, they must be able to demonstrate that the child’s relocation is for 
the purpose of school attendance or for an official apprenticeship in a state-sanctioned 
sector. Crucially, Article 14 establishes that it is illegal for a child to relocate 
independently of her legal guardians, and empowers the state to forcibly return the 
child to her family in cases where she has done so. In similar fashion, Article 4 
establishes that relocation for ‘exploitation’ constitutes trafficking and is thus illegal, 
irrespective of any consent offered, with exploitation taken to comprise all that one 
finds in the Palermo Protocol definition of trafficking and any work that is liable to 
damage the ‘health, security, or morality’ of the child. As per the ILO anti-child 
labour framework in operation in the country, the privilege of defining precisely what 
constitutes such work is reserved for the state.  
 
One of the prime goals of such heavy-handed legislation was to give Benin’s law 
enforcement agencies a platform for both arresting and discouraging the traffickers 
that are seen as so central to the apparently widespread child trafficking in the 
 
2 http://www.unicef.org/media/media_30926.html 
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country. From the head office of his IO, Fulani lamented that too often traffickers are 
able to ‘get away with their crimes’ and argued that governments must use these kinds 
of laws to prosecute and establish a deterrent (Interview with Fulani, 28/5/9). Toto, a 
very senior figure within Beninese law enforcement, concurred, declaring that when 
the government wants to stop something, a law is needed, and from there ‘we can hit 
the crime hard’ (Interview with Toto, 3/3/10). An example of what such hard-hitting 
looks like on the ground came in an interview with two men whose brother had been 
arrested when accompanying his nieces on a journey to another brother’s house in 
Gabon. Unaware of the legal changes, the man was arrested as a trafficker and, 
according to a colleague present during our interview, was now in prison (Interview 
with Winston; Interview with Wilis, 19/8/7).  
 
Such ‘traffickers’ are clearly not the only target of this law, however. When offering 
his opinion as to its wider functioning, Alec, a Beninese national working for an IO in 
Cotonou, declared that movement control and prevention of child movement more 
generally were central. ‘We need a return to the Revolution3’, he shouted, ‘all 
movement should be controlled’ (Interview with Alec, 23/2/10). When I sought 
clarification with a senior government official over whether such anti-movement 
tendencies were widely shared, or whether the anti-movement tone of the law had 
simply been the result of judicial heavy-handedness, this was the exchange we had: 
 
‘Neil: Is [the law] practicable though? How can a poor, illiterate villager get 
together the money and documents necessary to legally place his child? 
  
Deg: That’s the point. It isn’t practicable. The goal is to ban placement. You 
can’t tell the difference between placement and trafficking anyway, so we 
need to ban it all’. 
 
(Interview with Deg, 10/3/10) 
 
Cooperation with Nigeria 
 
Intricately related to the promulgation and implementation of Benin’s anti-trafficking 
law was the signing and operationalising of it’s Memorandum of Understanding 
(MOU) with Nigeria. Again, Phil explained: 
 
‘Nigeria was a big issue for us, because we realised that Nigeria was the 
major destination for Beninese kids. We therefore needed to establish a 
partnership with them. UNICEF convinced both governments to get 
together and have regular meetings on trafficking. We wanted to develop an 
MOU on the issue, which we eventually did. I was the facilitator for the 
meetings and chaired all the sessions, which included ministry people, civil 
society, etc…Ultimately, the agreement was signed in Cotonou at the 
Foreign Ministry in 2006. It’s a very good document, stating the multi-level 
cooperation that is to take place between the countries, from police, to 
border officials to the BPM and NAPTIP4. Each country also developed 
 
3 By ‘revolution’, Alec means the authoritative rule of Mathieu Kérékou, officially termed a Marxist-Leninist Revolution. 
Movement was heavily policed during this period. 
4 The two police agencies responsible for anti-trafficking work in Benin and Nigeria respectively. 
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concrete joint and separate plans of action, including border sensitisation. 
That component of the work was developed as a result of our previous 
surveys. Ministers and UNICEF staff all went to border villages and told 
people that the law had changed and that behaviour must therefore also 
change. They told people that there were severe punishments for 
transgression, including 25 years in jail. Some people have in fact now been 
arrested. We got data on it, which the US were really keen on getting and 
publishing’. 
 
(Interview with Phil, 9/11/9) 
 
Phil’s description and assessment were echoed by Dibi, Benin’s most senior civil 
servant responsible for the country’s anti-trafficking work. In expounding on the 
various strands of Benin’s anti-trafficking strategy, he explained: 
 
‘Another major component of what we do is international agreements, 
particularly with Nigeria. We have lots of meetings to address our 
coordination, develop and check the implementation of the joint plans of 
action. This is what we renew each year, and did so only a month ago. As 
part of this, we have even set up a brigade specifically to stop trans-national 
traffickers and to monitor and if necessary shut the borders. This brigade is 
composed of police, customs officers and communities themselves in order 
to strengthen borders with Nigeria, Niger and Togo. The Nigerians have set 
up the same thing on their side, on the Porto-Novo road’. 
 
(Interview with Dibi, 10/3/10) 
 
Further interviews and documentary analysis confirm this picture. One colleague of 
mine, who represents a civil society presence on both the coordination committee for 
the MOU and in the ground-level ‘sensitisation’ teams, explained that in practice it is 
all about harmonising institutional responses at the political level, providing support 
for the expansion of border controls and persuading border communities to desist 
from the mobility that the policy establishment see as so problematic. 
 
The Village Committees 
 
Perhaps the major component in the state and pseudo-state anti-trafficking arsenal has 
been the establishment of what were first denominated ‘village vigilance committees’, 
and what have subsequently become known as ‘village child protection committees’.  
Abidi was the IO employee responsible for establishing the very first of these, in an 
initiative that partnered the state, two influential IOs, two particularly active donors 
and a collection of local, sub-contracted NGOs. He explained: 
 
‘This was an innovative thing for us. They were good and people came from 
all over to see them in action. At the start it was a result of the willingness 
of citizens to help vulnerable kids. They were volunteers and helped us and 
NGOs. [We] told them to organise and that it is within the community that 
you can find an answer to the problem. They were very informal at the start 
and then we decided to spread the model around the country as we went to 
villages to sensitise people. We tried to form committees everywhere. We 
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got influential people involved to convince parents not to let kids leave. 
When they had been sensitised, we built on that…Now if I evaluate I can’t 
say that they were totally informal as the state got involved and worked with 
the communities via the local authorities. The Mayor helps, while the state 
and [our agency] sustain them materially’.  
 
    (Interview with Abidi, 12/1/10) 
 
His narration was paralleled by Dibi, the civil servant we encountered earlier, whose 
words reveal that the committees represent, capillary-like, the state’s arm in the 
village: 
 
 ‘We are very strongly supported by UNICEF, especially in the sending 
zones, where we’ve set up committees and strengthened communal 
authorities. Last year, for example, 38 village committees were set up in 
Donga and Atacora alone, taking the total to over 1400 throughout the 
country. These are a key initiative, because they permit the communities to 
participate. The DEA5 sets them up and UNICEF pays for them. The CPS’ 
manage and coordinate them at the local level, while NGOs are involved to 
help with the job…[They] receive training and equipment, but no money. 
…[Their goal] is to stop kids leaving, because leaving home is what leads to 
trafficking. They therefore liaise with the local police and the CPS, working 
together to prevent departure’. 
 
(Interview with Dibi, 10/3/10) 
 
Though official documentation points to a wide variety of tasks performed by, and 
goals worked for, the village committees, these interviews, interviews with committee 
members, and myriad unpublished material relating to their operation clearly suggest 
that their major objective is to pre-emptively protect children by thwarting their 
movement. An important internal IO document from 2006 thus reveals that the 
emphasis in activities is squarely placed on ‘community surveillance [regarding 
movement]’, while an allegedly suppressed consultant’s report offered precisely the 
same conclusion, arguing that most of the work they do is ‘anti-movement’ (Interview 
with Miguel, former Senior INGO Figure, 31/4/9; Botte and UNICEF 2005:16). This 
was echoed by numerous committee members in villages where I conducted primary 
research. Charley, head of his committee, said that each village quartier has an 
official who is tasked with ‘watching over’ child departures (Interview with Charley, 
Zelele Village, 19/4/10), while Cliff, also a committee head, explained that the 
committees were ‘vigilance bodies to stop children leaving’ (Interview with Cliff, 
Sehere Village, 7/4/10). 
 
Sensitisation and ‘Responsibilisation’ 
 
Though the Beninese government (and many institutional partners) would apparently 
like to be able to compel the stifling of child movement as widely as possible, policy-
makers are acutely aware that the resources for total surveillance and enforcement are 
lacking, and thus that a degree of individual self-policing is necessary. The key 
 
5 A branch of the Family Ministry. 
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watch-words in this self-policing drive are ‘sensitisation’ and ‘responsibilisation’. In 
examining how important such work is to the wider anti-trafficking panoply, it is 
noteworthy that every single official document relating to anti-trafficking policy in 
Benin features ‘sensitisation’ as one of the key project activities undertaken or to be 
undertaken. IO reports show ‘sensitisation’ to have been central to anti-trafficking 
efforts every year for the last decade, each of the organisations I have worked with 
have used ‘sensitisation’ or ‘responsibilisation’ as a core plank of their activities, the 
Government’s POA lists ‘sensitisation’ as one of its major strategic recommendations 
(MFE and ILO 2008:26), and the National Study concludes much the same (MFE et 
al. 2007).  
 
What does this entail? Individual activities vary. They include widespread public 
information and advocacy messages broadcast on national radio, on national 
television and in road-side poster campaigns. They include NGO staff heading into 
villages to bring together inhabitants and ‘inform’ them of the dangers of ‘x’ or ‘y’. 
Or they include the development and dissemination of material such as Ana, Bazil and 
The Trafficker, a massively widely-diffused ‘sensitisation film’, which was rolled out 
around the country using mobile cinemas and sub-contracted NGOs. Below is a series 




6 Source: http://www.c-n-a.org/news42.htm 
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What is the dominant content of these sensitisation and responsibilisation drives? 
There are two main strands. The first revolves around creating ‘modern’, ‘aware’, 
‘responsible’ parents, attentive to their children’s needs as rights-bearers and able to 
provide them with ‘healthy childhoods’. In this regard, Banda, a donor representative 
in Cotonou, encapsulated the general trend of such work when saying that his agency 
funds efforts that focus on ‘evolving peasant mentalities’ (Interview with Banda, 
2/3/10), while at one major child protection workshop I attended, I repeatedly heard 
how vital these efforts were for helping ‘social norms evolve’. Such opinions found 
favour also with Idyl, a donor figure in Cotonou, who explained that key to all her 
work was the notion that parents abdicating their ‘responsibilities’ needed to be 
‘responsibilised’: 
 
‘Neil: Is your goal to keep children at home?  
Idyl: Yes, absolutely.  
Neil: Why?  
Idyl: Our understanding of the fight against trafficking is that local 
development and family responsibilisation are key. 
Neil: So what would policy look like in your ideal world?  
Idyl: It would teach parents how to parent, because it’s not easy. We’d get 
rid of bad practices and build on good ones. We’d get kids in school…’ 
 
(Interview with Idyl, 1/3/10) 
 
Idyl’s words here point to the second main strand of what 
responsibilisation/sensitisation means in practice – reformulating peasant opinions so 
that people ‘understand’ child movement as negative, and thus that they self-police by 
keeping their children at home. Abidi and Dibi indicated as much in their descriptions 
of the work of the village committees. Celestin, a local government official 
responsible for the commune in which I conducted much of my ground-level research, 
said much the same. Asked if he was involved in any such ‘sensitisation’, he replied 
in the affirmative, explaining that his staff, NGOs and the committees with which he 
works frequently go to backwater villages to describe ‘why leaving is bad’ (Interview 
with Celestin, 6/4/10). Such claims were echoed both by village committee members 
and by ordinary villagers I interviewed. Both Charley and Cliff, mentioned above, 
highlighted this kind of sensitisation as key to what they do (Interview with Cliff, 
Sehere Village, 7/4/10; Interview with Charley, Zelele Village, 19/4/10), while a 
group from a neighbouring village claimed unanimously that they repeatedly hear the 
message that leaving is a major problem, at school, from white people, and from 




When asking policy-makers the question, ‘in an ideal world, how would you deal with 
child trafficking?’, the predominant response was ‘by getting children into school’. 
Similarly, when discussing with policy-makers what childhood should look like, a 
frequent refrain was that ‘school is where children should be’. This is reflected in the 
dominant ILO anti-child labour platform adopted by Benin, and indeed in the related 
legislation that mandates schooling for all under-14s. It should perhaps be no surprise, 
therefore, that the promotion and expansion of schooling represents a key target for 
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the anti-trafficking community, with interviews and policy documents revealing its 
strategic centrality.   
 
In discussions with one donor, for example, I heard flatly that, instead of an anti-
trafficking law, what Benin actually needs is a law (and related enforcement) that 
obliges all children to attend school, and for this schooling to be truly free (Interview 
with Idyl, 1/3/10). Veronica, a local government official, explained that a key strand 
of the work she does is educating people about the importance of schooling, 
particularly for girls. UNICEF have been especially supportive of this, she stated, 
including by funding sensitisation, schools and school places, all of which have led to 
an increase in enrolment (Interview with Veronica, 7/4/10). The POA also supports 
Veronica’s position, citing the correlation between being out of school and being 
trafficked and thus recommending an increase in schooling as one of the major axes 
through which the country can tackle the crime (MFE and ILO 2008:66).  
 
Getting children into school thus represents at once both a key end for the anti-
trafficking and child protection community in Benin and a key means for achieving 
the specific goal of preventing trafficking. On the one hand, school is ‘where children 
should be’ (as opposed to away from home working), and so ensuring that that is 
where they are is crucial. On the other, having them in school is believed to prevent 
them from departing for work, and ultimately ending up in situations of exploitation 
and trafficking. As the POA states, children in school are less likely to be trafficked. 
Or, in the words of Abidi, good schools have been proven to prevent child departures, 
so their establishment is now encouraged (Interview with Abidi, 12/1/10). Deg 
concurred:  
 
‘The major strategy is to promote mass schooling, especially for girls, as 
we’ve noted that girls are the most trafficked and that trafficking decreases 
when kids are in school. The two major goals of schooling are therefore a) 
to make it harder for kids to leave, because if they are in school people will 
notice that they’re gone, and b) to ensure that they have something to do, 
because the kids that leave are often the kids that are at home without an 
activity’.  
 
(Interview with Deg, 10/3/10) 
 
Family Planning and Birth Registration 
 
Similarly understood as both means and desirable end is the drive by Benin’s anti-
trafficking and wider child protection community for comprehensive family planning 
and birth registration in the country.  
 
In the case of family planning, BØRNEfonden’s recent assessment of their anti-
trafficking work in Benin encapsulates an understanding that transcends the policy 
community: much more work is needed on ‘causes’ of trafficking, such as large 
family sizes and the lack of family planning (2009:38). The logic behind such 
thinking is that large families are generally poor, it is poor families whose children 
work, and thus a reduction of family sizes will be useful for preventing the labour 
exploitation that constitutes trafficking. In the words of Jemima:  
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‘We need to make sure people have less kids. Families should only have as 
many as they can afford. We cant have people having kids just to then send 
them off to be trafficked’. 
 
(Interview with Jemima, 17/3/10) 
 
Similarly Cynthia, a fellow local government official: 
 
‘It is absolutely essential to reduce family sizes. Two children should 
already be a maximum, because resources are so limited for child support’.  
 
(Interview with Cynthia, 38/8/7) 
 
It should not be surprising that campaigns to this effect have already been initiated 
and are currently expanding. My research in villages in fact revealed that the ‘have 
less children so that your children can have a proper childhood’ message has long 
since reached ground level. A mixed group of adult villagers told me that they 
frequently heard how important it was to have less children, ‘both on the radio and in 
the health centres’ (Interview with Group 8, Tenga Village, 9/5/10), while a group of 
adult males explained that ‘the state has started to talk about birth control and family 
planning here, trying to get us to reduce the number of children we have’ (Group 2 
Interview, Southern Benin, 12/4/10).  
 
With regards to birth registration, although the chain of causality is not articulated 
quite as clearly as it is with large family size, the lack of total birth registration is 
generally assumed to represent a ‘cause’ of trafficking in Benin, and thus it is 
believed that registering births must form a preventive policy response. In the 
country’s POA, for example, we read that: 
 
‘In 2001, it was estimated that a third of Beninese children had not had their 
births registered with the state. These children are particularly vulnerable to 
trafficking, because they cannot be expected to receive healthcare and 
education, or be watched over by these services. Without an official national 
identity, resulting from this lack of official documentation, these children 
are often a trafficker’s first victims’. 
 
(MFE and ILO 2008:21) 
 
Hence, in one study of the work of village committees, we learn that pushing villagers 
to register every birth represents a top-level priority (Botte and UNICEF 2005:17). 
Similarly, in the National Study, we are told that expanding birth registration 
constitutes a major recommendation for winning the fight against trafficking, with 
27.1% of all bodies involved in ‘prevention’ already engaged in precisely this effort 
(MFE  and UNICEF 2007:77). 
 
The Fight Against Poverty and ‘IGAs’ 
 
Since poverty is widely assumed to be at the root of much trafficking, it should be 
expected that tackling ‘poverty’ forms a cornerstone of the fight against the crime. On 
paper at least, for many bodies involved in the field, it does. The National Study  
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trumpets ‘fighting poverty’ as one of the main ways Benin must address trafficking 
(MFE  and UNICEF 2007:77), while the POA highlights that this is central to national 
efforts and is being undertaken transversally through certain measures that comprise 
part of Benin’s Poverty Reduction Strategy elaborated with the World Bank (MFE 
and ILO 2008:65-7). In similar vein, Jayjay, a donor government officer working in 
Benin, explained that while more was needed in this regard, we must not forget that 
money is being donated and ‘transversal’ contributions are made through finance for 
agricultural projects, infrastructure and ‘other structural issues’ (Interview with 
Jayjay, 2/4/10) 
 
Jayjay’s mention of structure here is significant, since it points to the way in which 
the ‘tackling poverty’ component of anti-trafficking policy tends to play out in 
practice. Though certain corollary institutional initiatives do work on large-scale (or 
‘structural’) issues related to poverty, most specifically anti-trafficking poverty 
reduction efforts target what little resources they have at individuals, families or small 
communities, predominantly in the form of time-bound donations or support for 
‘Income Generating Activities’ (IGAs). In order to illustrate how this approach 
functions, I will draw on a case study of the ILO’s LUTRENA project, which was the 
organisation’s flagship anti-trafficking initiative in West Africa throughout much of 
the 2000’s, and which centred on a ‘Poverty Reduction Strategy’. I have chosen this 
as an example because I believe it encapsulates the way poverty is ‘tackled’ within 
anti-trafficking policy more widely, with the analysis below mirroring ones I have 
seen and myself offered elsewhere. These extracts come from an independent ILO 
evaluation of LUTRENA’s success at its conclusion in 2007 (ILO-IPEC 2007:v-17). 
 









The importance of poverty as a cause of child trafficking – ‘CT’ – is made clear in the 
paragraph below: 
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Elaborating further, we see how this relates to LUTRENA’s use of targeted ‘Action 
Program’s’ (including IGAs): 
 
 
Unfortunately, such targeting is not, in the view of the evaluators, quite as successful 
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The evaluator’s conclusion is one which, in my experience, is shared by analysts of 






Thus far, all of the policy strands examined in this paper have fallen into the category 
of trafficking prevention. In this final sub-section, I shall examine how the anti-
trafficking panoply seek to protect those who have already been trafficked.  
 
Though there are some who seek to intervene directly and remove children from 
working situations deemed equivalent to trafficking, protection efforts in this field 
revolve predominantly around the funding and running of shelters for ‘rescued’ 
children and the re-insertion of children returned from ‘situations of trafficking’. I 
have worked with two major organisations engaged in this effort – one national, one 
international, and both vital pillars of the anti-trafficking and child protection 
establishment – and it is on the basis of the in-depth participant observation garnered 
from these experiences that I write. 
 
Generally, all of the major actors involved in the anti-trafficking field contribute in 
some way to the protection of victims. Major donors, from the state, through IOs to 
bilaterals, limit their contributions to financing, but it is their money which pays 
operational overheads. Thus, in the INGO shelter in which I worked, for example, 
UNICEF had for many years footed the bill as part of its anti-trafficking protection 
volet, while in the extract below we see the US paying over $150,000 to Caritas to 
fund that organisation’s vocational training centres for former victims (USDS-TIP: 
2005):  
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While the major institutional players pay, then, it is the ‘service provider’ national and 
international NGOs that run protection operations on a daily basis. Usually, this will 
involve a mixture of activities. At times, long-term shelter is offered and centres 
function almost as orphanages. At others, shelters provide shorter-term rehabilitation, 
including of course food and accommodation, but also psycho-social support, until a 
child is ready to be ‘reinserted’. Sometimes, such reinsertion is not necessary, and a 
child will be supported ‘en milieu ouvert’ – literally, ‘out in the open’ – while living 
with his or her family. 
 
A major component of all these different means of protection is support or preparation 
for the child’s growth into an independent adulthood. Without fail, and in line with 
the normative, legal framework around childhood in Benin, this consists of one of two 
things. Either children will be schooled or will receive small bursaries (be they 
financial or in kind, with school materials) in order to remain in school. Or they will 
receive a professional apprenticeship in one of a number of different fields. In my 
experience, the options from which children ‘choose’ these apprenticeships are very 
narrow, and remain highly gendered. Thus, boys will almost invariably be trained as 
mechanics or craftsmen, while girls will, as one INGO employee lamented, ‘have 
either hairdressing or sewing!’ (Interview with Alexia, 1/9/7). 
  
Analysis and Discussion 
 
The above discussion has offered a comprehensive overview of all the major policy 
actions undertaken by the various different institutional actors operating within 
Benin’s anti-trafficking field. Despite their different means of contributing to the 
shared goal of protecting children from trafficking, it should be clear that the two 
dominant trends running across the gamut of anti-trafficking initiatives are 1) pre-
emptively preventing the migration that is seen to lead to children being trafficked, 
and 2) promoting ‘healthy’ childhoods that involve children being in school, staying 
at home with their families and avoiding work. 
 
In this the final section of the paper, I will move beyond this observation and will 
suggest that this dominant approach to anti-trafficking can be profitably analysed 
through the lens of Michel Foucault’s work, notably through his concepts of 
‘disciplinary’ and ‘productive’ power, each of which combine against the backdrop of 
neoliberalism to produce neoliberal subject(ivitie)s. Though space does not allow for 
a comprehensive elaboration of Foucault’s scholarship, I will briefly clarify what I 
understand by these concepts, before applying them to the policies depicted in the 
previous section. 
 
In his early research, Foucault elaborated the notion of ‘discipline’, which he took to 
refer to the juridical establishment of what is and is not acceptable conduct, enforced 
by the compulsion of punishments which accrue to deviance (Foucault 1976 and 
1977). Intricately linked to this notion of discipline was that of ‘production’. As 
Foucault explains, “[Power] needs to be considered as a productive network which 
runs through the whole social body” (1984b:119), generating self-governing, self-
disciplining individual subject(ivitie)s through mechanisms of consciousness 
formation. Crucially, these two means of conducting conduct are intricately 
interwoven. As Foucault states:  
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‘I think it is indisputable, or hardly disputable, that discipline normalizes… 
Disciplinary normalization consists first of all in positing a model, an 
optimal model that is constructed in terms of a certain result, and the 
operation of disciplinary normalization consists in trying to get people, 
movements, and actions to conform to this model, the normal being 
precisely that which can conform to this norm, and the abnormal that which 
is incapable of conforming to the norm’ (2007:56).  
 
Discipline and production, then, go hand in hand. A norm of behaviour is established 
(or crystallized), and part of its enforcement rests on encouraging its widespread 
internalisation, either through fear or through persuasion, such that individuals come 
themselves to reflect and mirror that dominant norm.  
 
In the contemporary world, Foucault argues, the dominant model of societal 
governance is neoliberalism and thus the dominant mirror reflection/incarnation of 
that model at the level of the individual is the neoliberal ‘homo economicus’ 
(1979:401). Tracing the genesis of this model in his lectures at the Collège de France, 
Foucault argued that the innovation of early liberalism as a political, economic and 
social philosophy for governance was its acceptance that no authority could 
effectively manage every individual in every contingent situation, and thus that 
government should adopt a mode of laissez-faire stewardship that allowed the 
‘invisible hand’ of the market to drive the world forward, but which tried, like a good 
father managing his family, to prudently manage what resources it has for the 
common good (Burchell 1991:18/92). The current version of this philosophy involves 
minimization of state participation in the ‘market’, the acceptance of distributions of 
resources and power as pre-facto realities not to be interfered with (Mitchell 
2004:389), and thus the placing of responsibility for economic well-being solely on 
the shoulders of the individual economic agent – in Foucault’s terms the ‘homo 
economicus’, whose duty it is to maximize himself as a vehicle of capital and self-
advancement (Burchell 1990:36-40). 
 
How may these concepts apply to anti-trafficking policy in Benin? In the case of 
discipline, by far the major emphasis of Benin’s anti-trafficking strategy has clearly 
been on the forced reduction of child movement as a pre-emptive tool to prevent 
eventual exploitation and thus trafficking. Child movement is treated as almost 
synonymous with trafficking, and the anti-trafficking establishment therefore seeks to 
suppress that movement, using the full (and enhanced) power of the state to do so. 
This is evidenced in various coercive measures, including in the establishment of 
border patrols, cooperation with Nigeria on the surveillance of trans-border 
movements, the various stipulations of the ‘anti-trafficking law’ and the establishment 
of the village committees. Such measures constitute discipline in two key ways. On 
the one hand, they involve the use of state force to compel obedience by suppressing 
behaviour that has been identified as unacceptable. On the other, the very theatrical 
nature of law-enforcement or border sensitisation messages which warn of 25 years in 
prison represent a performative push which suggests that fear is being employed as a 
tactic to enforce compliance.  
 
The fear-factor is also important as a tool of productive power, since its goal is clearly 
to encourage citizens to internalise and own self-policing anti-movement messages. 
Production goes far beyond both fear and anti-movement here though. Anti-
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trafficking policy in Benin does not seek solely to hammer or scare Beninese citizens 
into the sedentary shape desired by the establishment; it also seeks to mould them, 
through widespread persuasion and encouragement, to take on the form the 
establishment prefers and subsequently maintain, of their own accord, its correlated 
behaviour. This is of course evidenced in the massive importance of ‘sensitisation’ 
efforts that aim to create ‘healthy childhoods’ by convincing parents that children 
‘should’ be at home, that family sizes need reducing, and that school is the ‘right’ 
place for children to be.  
 
More significant perhaps than this, however, is the dominant type of individual anti-
trafficking policy seeks to create through the promotion of these protective healthy 
childhoods. If we recall what activities are viewed and pushed as legitimate for 
children in this policy world (be that through sensitisation, legal norms or 
‘reinsertion’ after having been trafficked), it is notable that options are restricted to 
either school or a professional, pre-work apprenticeship. Similarly, in dealing with 
poverty, anti-trafficking policy’s dominant approach is to target the individual – by 
promoting skills-based IGAs. What does this mean? It means that through education 
and skill development, the anti-trafficking establishment is working towards the 
creation of self-sufficient, responsible and independent economic actors able to 
survive in the world of the market – in other words, the ‘homo economicus’. 
 
The neoliberal underpinnings of this approach are apparent. In ‘fighting poverty’ 
through the vehicle of individual responsibilisation, neither the Beninese state nor any 
of its partners seek to modify the structural realities of the market economy; rather, in 
classic neo/liberal fashion, they leave the market untrammelled by the hand of state 
intervention. The neoliberalism of Beninese anti-trafficking policies goes beyond this 
however. While migration is generally demonised within the policy establishment, 
many policy-makers accept that not all migrant children necessarily end up in 
situations of trafficking, yet they target all migrant children’s movement as a pre-
emptive strategy to protect those that they believe do. Why is this? Quite simply, it is 
because it is viewed as a cost-effective means of ensuring protection.  
 
As Foucault noted, neo/liberalism promotes the belief that a government must operate 
in a fiscally prudent fashion, making basic financial trade-off decisions in the way a 
household head does with a family budget, while accepting its financial limitations 
(and the structures which underpin those) as fact. What this means is that, despite 
claims to the contrary, governments including Benin’s do not create policies which 
are optimal, but which are affordable. As such, in one discussion with Sandra, an 
INGO staffer based in Cotonou, I asked why the state and its partners did not fight 
exploitation in general, as opposed to exploitation solely in the context of movement. 
Her response was telling. Though admitting that many believe this would be ideal, she 
lamented that ‘it is difficult in Africa and in poor countries in general to fight against 
exploitation because you need a lot of money to do so’ (Interview with Sandra, 1/9/7). 
Her answer was paralleled by Didi, a Ministry of Justice official, who admitted that 
‘we would love to reinforce labour inspectorates, but we lack the means to do so. 
Indeed the whole state lacks the means since it was rolled back in recent decades’ 
(Interview with Didi, 3/4/10). Perhaps most tellingly of all are the words of Celestin, a 
communal level government official, with whom I had the following exchange: 
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‘Neil: Why don’t we work to stop exploitation instead of movement?  
 
Celestin: That’s impossible. It’s too difficult…It’s easier to stop people 
moving’. 
 




Celestin’s words are worth bearing in mind, since they encapsulate much of what this 
paper has tried to demonstrate. Drawing on data from interviews, participant 
observation and relevant documentation obtained from across the anti-trafficking 
spectrum, I have outlined the major contours of policy in this field and have suggested 
that the central thrust of each is to protect children from trafficking by promoting 
‘healthy childhoods’ and pre-emptively preventing/regulating child movement. As 
such, I have suggested that policy represents a classical example of disciplinary and 
productive power and that through these vehicles it seeks to create neoliberal 
subject(ivitie)s against the framing backdrop of neoliberalism. What we have here, 
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